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Article
Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage
in Targeting People Under the Law of Armed
Conflict
Krista Nelson*

Abstract
The law of armed conflict (LOAC) requires that attacks on
objects promise a military advantage, but allows attacks on certain
categories of people regardless of utility. This Article compares the
law on targeting people and objects and suggests that the law on
targeting people should be reformed to include the advantage
requirement that governs the targeting of objects. Other proposals
to refine the law on targeting people draw from law enforcement or
peacetime human rights law; critics claim that those proposals
inappropriately treat war like peace, and armed forces like police.
By contrast, this Article’s proposal draws from LOAC itself and
would help tailor the law to the strategic concerns at the heart of
military operations. Indeed, this proposal would advance LOAC’s
fundamental effort to prohibit useless violence, extending the
requirement of advantageous attacks to people.
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Advantageous Attacks: The Role of Advantage
in Targeting People Under the Law of Armed
Conflict
Krista Nelson
Introduction
The question of who may be attacked under the law of armed
conflict (LOAC) has given rise to controversy and uncertainty.1 The
practice of targeted killing in counterterrorism operations has
brought attacking people to the forefront of LOAC debates.2
According to current approaches to the war on terror, killing people
has taken on a strategic importance – not just prominence – that it
has not had in other recent conflicts.3 The rules regarding targeting
*J.D., Yale Law School; Ph.D. (War Studies), King’s College London;
B.A., University of Chicago. I am grateful to Michael Reisman and Lea Brilmayer
for helpful comments and conversations.
1
See Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 27, 38
1
See Jens David Ohlin, Is Jus in Bello in Crisis?, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 27, 38
(2013); NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE
ACTORS, 154-55 (2010).
2
See, e.g., Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, Study on Targeted Killings, ¶ 57,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/ 14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (“The greatest source of the lack
of clarity with respected to targeted killings in the context of armed conflict is who
qualifies as a lawful target, and where and when the person may be targeted.”);
Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Keynote Address at the American
Society of International Law Annual Meeting: The Obama Administration and
International Law (March 25, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm; Charlie Savage, At White
House, Weighing Limits of Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/16/us/white-house-weighs-limits-of-terrorfight.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (on the debate on killing lower-level Al Qaeda
members).
3
See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Book Review: Extraterritorial Use of Force
Against Non-State Actors by Noam Lubell, LAWFARE (Nov. 19, 2011),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/11/extraterritorial-use-of-force-against-non-
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people in non-international armed conflict continue to generate
considerable controversy, even as they govern prominent ongoing
policies like targeted killings. The relatively clear rules on targeting
in international armed conflict have prompted new interpretations
and proposals. Both sets of rules raise questions about the criteria
and principles behind targeting rules, including the role of status,
membership in militaries or armed groups, behavior, and threat.
However, the rules used to distinguish between people do not include
a fundamental concept at the heart of distinguishing between objects
– the advantage anticipated to result from the attack.
This Article first explains the rules on targeting people and
contrasts them with the rules on targeting objects, showing how the
rules on targeting people do not require anticipated advantage. The
second section outlines a potential advantage requirement and
weighs arguments for and against the addition of such a requirement.
An advantage requirement would operate over and above existing
rules, acting as an additional layer of protection. This Article
concludes that an advantage requirement could be a desirable,
strategically flexible constraint that rejects the assumption that
attacks on people promise a military advantage and serves the
fundamental LOAC goal of reducing useless violence.
I.

Attacking People and Objects Under the Law of Armed
Conflict

The regulation of attacks – “acts of violence against the
adversary, whether in offence or in defence” – stands at the
conceptual and practical center of LOAC.4 LOAC approaches attacks
state-actors/ (suggesting that the Obama administration’s drone program changed
the character of war in the counterterrorism context).
4
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(1),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. See also Nobuo
Hayashi, Requirements of Military Necessity in International Humanitarian Law
and International Criminal Law, 28 B.U. INT'L L.J. 39, 110-12 (2010)
(distinguishing between attack and destruction). While attacks may be governed by
other legal regimes, LOAC serves as the lex specialis in armed conflict, and this
analysis focuses on that law.
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as a matter of targeting, which may be defined as the selection of
objects and people subject to or intended to be made the object of
attack and the process by which those attacks are carried out.5
Encompassing fundamental rules like distinction and proportionality,
targeting law draws together key elements of LOAC. Yet, at the
center of targeting law lies a divide. The law breaks the universe of
potential targets into two major categories – objects and people – and
governs those categories with different rules. This section contrasts
the differing rules on distinction, which lacks an advantage
requirement for targeting people, and then looks beyond distinction
to see whether other parts of targeting law may fill the gap.
A.

Distinction and People

The rules on who may be targeted vary somewhat based on
the status of the person (combatant or civilian) and the status of the
armed conflict (international or non-international). The law’s
approach to distinction with respect to people focuses on two main
categories: combatants and civilians, with key exceptions. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on
customary international humanitarian law lists as the first rule: “The
parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians
and combatants. Attacks may only be directed against combatants.
Attacks must not be directed against civilians.”6 The ICRC study
5

See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 519 (2010); Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the
Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 277, 277-78 (Susan C. Breau & Agnieszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006) (on the
linear nature of the law of attack). The definition used here was inspired partly by
the definition used by Gary Solis with respect to objects, but it is broader in two
ways. First, it covers people as well as objects. Second, it includes the process of
selecting objects or people which may be attacked and not just objects or people
against which an attack is planned. This second notion suggests that lawful attacks
may be conducted against a category or group of objects or people; one need not
select particular objects or individuals to be attacked.
6
JEAN-MARIE HENCHKAERTS & LOUIS DOWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3 (2009),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarianlaw-i-icrc-eng.pdf [hereinafter ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY]. The ICRC’s study
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describes this rule as a “norm of customary international law
applicable in both international and non-international armed
conflicts,” and explains that in this rule the term “combatant”
indicates “persons who do not enjoy the protection against attack
accorded to civilians,” and does not address combatant status or
prisoner-of-war status.7 While distinctions between combatants and
others have implications for detention and trial, the core goal of
distinction is to determine which people and objects are open to
attack.
In international armed conflict (IAC), persons are open to
direct attack if they are members of the armed forces of a party to the
conflict (excepting religious and medical personnel), participants in a
levée en masse, or civilians directly participating in hostilities
(DPH).8 In non-international armed conflict (NIAC), persons are
open to direct attack if they are members of a state’s armed forces or
an organized armed group (which constitutes the armed forces of a
non-state party to the conflict), or civilians DPH.9 In nongenerated considerable controversy, but this rule was not the source of it. For treaty
law, see Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 48, 51(2), 52(1). Roberts and
Guelff write that Additional Protocol I Article 48 reflects the principle articulated
in the St. Petersburg Declaration that the only legitimate object is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy. DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF War 53 (Adam
Roberts & Richard Guelff eds., 3d ed. 2010).
7
See ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 3.
8
See id. at 11-14; Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 872 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 991, 995 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC Interpretive Guidance];
Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 2, Oct.18 1907
[hereinafter Hague Regulations](on levée en masse). Medical personnel and
chaplains are not combatants under Additional Protocol I and are not prisoners of
war under the Third Geneva Convention. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4,
art. 43(2); Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 33,
Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. One can conceive of these
exceptions as the product of a sort of categorization – medical personnel and
chaplains fall into different categories – or the product of conduct concerns,
because those people provide distinct and sensitive services which may justify
exemption from certain designations.
9
See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 995. For a discussion of
targeting law in NIAC and IAC, see Charles Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’ –
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international as well as international armed conflicts, “members of
State armed forces may be considered combatants” for the purposes
of distinction, though there is some resistance to the idea that
“combatants” exist in non-international armed conflict.10 In NIAC,
the role of non-state actors has inspired varied approaches to
combatants and civilians, with the controversy arising largely out of
discussions of membership in organized armed groups and civilians
DPH, discussed in greater depth below.
Combatants may be targeted at any time and place, even
when they are not fighting.11 A combatant can be hors de combat and
thus protected from direct attack in certain circumstances, for
example when in the power of the adversary or after surrender.12
The rules on attacking people reflect ideas about what actions
are useful and legitimate in military operations. The 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration, an early LOAC instrument which banned
certain explosive projectiles, states: “the only legitimate object which
States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the
military forces of the enemy … for this purpose it is sufficient to
Dilemmas on the Use of Force, 14 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 499 (2010). Geography
plays an uncertain and disputed role in the rules. See, e.g., Noam Lubell & Nathan
Derejko, A Global Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed
Conflict, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65, 81-86 (2013); Mary Ellen O’Connell,
Combatants and the Combat Zone, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 845, 863 (2009).
10
See ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 11; Alston, supra note 2,
at 19. See also Marco Sassòli and Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters : Admissible
Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 599, 605-08 (2008); Kenneth H. Watkin, Controlling the Use of
Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2004).
11
See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 5, at 188; Yoram Dinstein, The System of Status
Groups in International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES: SYMPOSIUM IN THE HONOUR OF KNUT IPSEN 145,
148 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Volker Epping, eds., 2007).
12
See Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 23(c); Additional Protocol I, supra
note 4, arts. 41 and 85(3)(e); Geneva Convention III, supra note 8, art. 3
(“Common Article 3”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts art. 4, June 8, 1977 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]; See also SOLIS,
supra note 5, at 188-89.
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disable the greatest possible number of men.”13 This legal instrument
presents a strategic vision based on neutralizing large numbers of
people who are members of armed forces, and this strategic vision
underlies the rules on attacking people.
Membership also forms the foundation for targeting rules on
organized armed groups, members of which may be attacked at any
time and in any place.14 The determination of membership presents
challenges; for example, membership in an organized armed group
other than dissident armed forces (parts of a state’s armed forces that
have turned against their government) may be informal and may not
coincide completely with affiliation.15 The ICRC determines
membership in an organized armed group on the basis of a
correspondence between the individual’s function and the conductof-hostilities function exercised by the group as a whole.16 An
alternative approach holds that membership in an organized armed
group should be determined in the way that determines membership
in a state’s armed forces, with the key factor being membership in an
organization under a command structure and less emphasis placed on
combat function.17
The rule that civilians are immune from attack unless they
directly participate in hostilities, which appears in treaty and
customary law, has generated controversy and uncertainty.18 The acts
13

Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29 1868 (The St. Petersburg Declaration).
14
See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 1006; Kevin Jon Heller,
‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’: Signature Strikes and International Law, 11 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 89, 93 (2013) (“Members of an organized armed groups [sic] are
targetable anywhere, at any time – even when they are not fighting.”).
15
See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 1006-07.
16
See Id., at 1007.
17
See Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the
ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 641, 690-91(2010).
18
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 51(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the
protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities.”); Additional Protocol II, supra note 12, art. 13(3) (“Civilians
shall enjoy the protection afforded by this part, unless and for such time as they
take a direct part in hostilities.”); ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at
19-24 (Rule 6); HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. ¶
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that constitute direct participation defy comprehensive or
uncontroversial listing, and the determination of DPH may proceed
on a case-by-case basis.19 Activities involving the application of
violence may clearly constitute direct participation, while financial
and other non-combat support may clearly be excluded.20 For
30 [2005](Isr.). Bill Boothby writes that “the customary rule, though distinct,
clearly owes much to the rule in AP1.” Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”:
The Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 741, 744 (2010). Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions grants
protection to persons “taking no active part in the hostilities.” See also Michael N.
Schmitt, Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: The Constitutive
Elements, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 699 (2010); ICRC Interpretive
Guidance, supra note 8. See also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 1112 (2d ed., 2004) (presenting and assessing a list of activities that may or may not
constitute direct participation in hostilities). For analysis of the ICRC study, see,
e.g., Dapo Akande, Clearing the Fog of War? The ICRC's Interpretive Guidance
on Direct Participation in Hostilities, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 180 (2010). The
ICRC’s claims regarding civilians DPH and restraints on the use of force were the
subject of considerable criticism, some of which came from experts who
participated in the study supporting the Interpretive Guidance. See, e.g., W. Hays
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC ‘Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Study: No
Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769
(2010); Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5 (2010).
The author of the guidance, Nils Melzer, has also elaborated on these topics in
other works. See NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008). Nils Melzer, Keeping the Balance between Military Necessity and
Humanity: A Response to Four Critiques of the ICRC's Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 831
(2010).
19
See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶ 177-78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008); Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT 94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 616 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); ROGERS, supra note 18, at 11-12 (presenting and
assessing a list of activities that may or may not constitute direct participation in
hostilities); INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON
THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949, 618-19 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, & Bruno
Zimmermann eds., 1987), available at
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=LookUpCO
MART&articleUNID=4BEBD9920AE0AEAEC12563CD0051DC9E [hereinafter
ICRC COMMENTARY].
20
Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 60.
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example, attacking members and equipment of enemy forces may
clearly qualify as direct participation in hostilities, whereas working
in a munitions factory may not.21 There have been efforts to create
more general criteria for DPH; for example the ICRC’s three
cumulative criteria for these acts: a threshold of harm, direct
causation of the harm by the act or operation of which it is a part, and
belligerent nexus governing the design of the act.22
A key difficulty with respect to civilians DPH is the temporal
limitations (unless and for such time as they take a direct part in
hostilities), which may allow civilians to engage in hostile acts with
impunity, slipping back into immunity from attack if their opponents
cannot attack or capture them while they are directly participating.23
One possible solution to the revolving door problem is the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance’s highly contested notion of a continuous
combat function (CCF): “In non-international armed conflict,
organized armed groups constitute the armed forces of a non-State
party to the conflict and consist only of individuals whose continuous
function it is to take a direct part in hostilities (‘continuous combat
function’).”24 The ICRC suggests that persons who have a CCF lose
their protection on a continuous basis, as long as they assume their
CCF, wherever they are and whatever they are doing.25 The notion of
21

See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 11; Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 61.
See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 995-96. See also Schmitt,
Deconstructing, supra note 18, at 711-39.
23
The language of Additional Protocols’ rules on civilians DPH – “and for such
time as” – suggests that openness to direct attack is limited to the period
surrounding the participation. See ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at
996. See also Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”: The Time Dimension to
Direct Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741 (2010).
24
ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 995. For a description of
continuous combat function, see Id., at 1007.
25
Id. at 996. This may depend on whether a person performing a CCF is a
member of an organized armed group, who are targetable wherever they are and
whatever they are doing. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 14, at 93 (“Members of an
organized armed groups [sic] are targetable anywhere, at any time – even when
they are not fighting.”). Claims regarding CCF and members of organized armed
groups may not overlap because there may be different views as to how a person
becomes a member of an organized group and in particular whether a CCF
constitutes the only path to membership. See also Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 62, ¶
65 (discussing the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance).
22
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CCF constitutes a combatant-like category which leaves persons
open to attack regardless of their conduct. 26 Criticism of the CCF
arises from those who think the notion leads to too narrow a scope
for targeting and those who think it may expand the scope of
targeting impermissibly.27 The notion of CCF may be lex ferenda,
not lex lata.28
Even apart from CCF, there may be a temptation to allow
civilians DPH to lose immunity from attack on a continuous basis in
order to prevent the revolving-door problem.29 Civilians DPH do not
have a clear end point equivalent to retirement or demobilization,
though surrender would certainly end direct participation.30
Nevertheless, rules on civilians DPH challenge somewhat the idea of
an enduring or inherent categorization, allowing targeting based on
conduct rather than status or membership in armed forces or groups.

26

See Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?’, supra note 9, at 506.
See Schmitt, Deconstructing, supra note 18, at 739 (“it is necessary to
dispense with the ‘belonging to a Party’ and ‘continuous combat Function’ aspects
of the concept of organized armed groups, extend participation as far up and
downstream as there is a causal link, and close the revolving door of
participation.”); Alston, supra note 2, at ¶ 65 (“[t]he creation of CCF category is,
de facto, a status determination that is questionable given the specific treaty
language that limits direct participation to ‘for such Time’ as opposed to ‘all the
time.’”).
28
See Ohlin, Crisis, supra note 1, at 37. However, the ICRC claims that “the 10
recommendations made by the Interpretive Guidance, as well as the accompanying
commentary, do not endeavour to change binding rules of customary or treaty IHL,
but reflect the ICRC’s institutional position as to how existing IHL should be
interpreted in light of the circumstances prevailing in contemporary armed
conflicts.” ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 991 (bold removed).
29
For example, one could treat members of organized armed groups as civilians
DPH and expand the temporal aspect of DPH to allow them to be targeted on a
continual basis. See LUBELL, EXTRATERROTORIAL USE OF FORCE, supra note 1, at
151-52, 154.
30
See Michael Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in
Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511,
536 (2004) (“[A] civilian who participates in hostilities remains a valid military
target until unambiguously opting out through extended nonparticipation or an
affirmative act of withdrawal”). The mechanics of surrender are not clear in the
context of air operations.
27
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Distinction and Objects

The law’s approach to distinguishing between people is not
the only way to apply the principle of distinction. In the law on
objects, advantage plays an explicit role. Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I provides the following definition of military objectives
with respect to objects: “military objectives are limited to those
objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage.”31 This definition of
military objectives contains two requirements: A) the object must
make an effective contribution to military action, and B) the object’s
destruction, capture or neutralization must offer a definite military
advantage. Under this definition, even an object which contributes to
military action by its nature – a category which covers traditional
military objects – is subject to the demands of the second part of the
definition which requires a definite military advantage.32 An object’s
31

Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 52(2). This definition is a norm of
customary international law. See ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at
29-31. The literature on military objectives is extensive. See, e.g., GEOFFREY
BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945, at 272-75 (1994); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE
CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
82-112 (2004); Marco Sassòli, Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of
“Military Objectives” for the Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed
Conflicts, in NEW WARS, NEW LAWS? APPLYING THE LAWS OF WAR IN 21ST
CENTURY CONFLICTS 181 (David Wippman & Matthew Evangelista eds., 2005);
see also W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A. F. L. REV. 1, 142
n.421 (1990) (commenting on Article 52(2)’s neglect of uncertainty and
speculative decision-making in war). Charles Garraway writes that in the 1991
Gulf War, the Article 52(2) definition “proved workable.” Charles Garraway, 25
Years of the Two Additional Protocols: their Impact on the Waging of War;
Challenges from New Types of Armed Conflicts, in THE TWO ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS: 25 YEARS LATER 147 (Guido Ravasi
& Gian Luca Beruto eds., 2004).
32
Some analyses collapse the two parts of Article 52(2) into one overarching
question, but retain the notion of advantage. See, e.g., U.S. AIR FORCE, AFP 14210, USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE 147 (Feb. 1, 1998), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usaf/afpam14-210/index.html (stating that “[t]he key
factor is whether the object makes an effective contribution to the adversary’s
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status is tethered to circumstances, periods of time, and strategies; it
does not fall into an enduring category. Under Article 52(2), even
traditional military objects may not be military objectives. But that
fact may lead to counterintuitive classifications, or at least
appellations – could a fighter jet in some circumstances be a civilian
object? Additional Protocol I offers no category for “traditionally
military but disadvantageous or useless” objects.33
However, other parts of Additional Protocol I reveal the
possibility that objects can have an assumed or permanent status as
military objectives. For example, Article 58 states that parties to a
conflict shall “avoid locating military objectives within or near
densely populated areas.”34 The ICRC’s commentary on Additional
Protocol I states that as “regards permanent objectives [for example,
a barracks], governments should endeavour to find places away from
densely populated areas to site them. These concerns should already
be taken into consideration in peacetime.”35 This provision suggests
military action, so that its capture, destruction, or neutralization offers a definite
military advantage in the circumstances ruling at the time.”) (emphasis added); see
also Sassòli, supra note 31, at 185-86 (noting the difficulty of fulfilling the second
part of the Art. 52(2) definition of military objectives without fulfilling the first).
The ICRC Commentary states that the “nature” category “comprises all objects
directly used by the armed forces: weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications,
depots, buildings occupied by armed forces, staff headquarters, communications
centres etc.” ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 636.
33
Additional Protocol I Article 52(1) states in part that “[c]ivilian objects are all
objects which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2.” Thus, the text
suggests that all objects are either military objectives or civilian objects, and
military objects which are not associated with the required contribution or
advantage would thus fall outside the military objectives definition and into the
category of civilian objects. See also Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of
Soldiers, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 69, 84 (Spring 2010) (on the example of a tank in a
museum). Additional Protocol I arts. 59 (on non-defended places) and 60 (on
demilitarized zones) provide that in certain circumstances some traditional military
objects would not be subject to attack.
34
Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 58(b).
35
ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 19, at 694. Sassòli states that, at least in the
1954 Hague Cultural Property Protocol, the prohibition on placement of cultural
property near military objectives suggests objects that could be military objectives,
not objects that already are. See Sassòli, supra note 31, at 199. Nonetheless, there
appears to be a presumption – like the law’s benefit of the doubt for traditional
civilian objects – that certain objects are military objectives. Furthermore,
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that not all determinations regarding military objectives may be
made on the basis of anticipated military advantage “in the
circumstances ruling” at a particular point in an armed conflict.
Proposed lists of military objectives highlight this approach.36
Debates within the 1999 NATO campaign over Kosovo –
Operation Allied Force – illustrate both the assumption that certain
objects are always legitimate military objectives and also challenges
to that assumption. Lieutenant General Michael Short, the
commander of the air campaign, stated in a post-campaign interview
that “[o]ne of my peers called it ‘random bombing of military
targets.’”37 However, some potential targets were rejected for lack of
utility. Harvey Dalton, standing in for the Legal Counsel to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a post-campaign conference,
stated that “even though it was hostilities, we did not go after all
military objects. We went after those that counted, or least the ones
we thought counted.”38
Additional Protocol I Article 52(3) gives examples of objects “normally dedicated
to civilian purposes,” identifying “a place of worship, a house or other dwelling or
a school.” Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, art. 52(3). Such objects may get the
benefit of the doubt if there is uncertainty as to whether they would meet the first
part of the definition of military objectives in Article 52(2).
36
See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 64, 67, 69-70, 83-85. Before offering his list,
Rogers writes that “[t]he mere fact that an object, such as a bridge or a
communications installation, is in the list does not mean that it is necessarily a
military objective. It must make an effective contribution to military action and its
neutralization must offer a definite military advantage.” Id. at 83. See also Hague
Rules of Aerial Warfare, Feb. 1923. See also DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR,
supra note 6, at 139-41 (for background). While rejected in the negotiation of
Additional Protocol I, lists of military objectives suggest that some lawmakers and
scholars believe it is possible to state that an object is a military objective without
undertaking the utility assessment required by Article 52(2).
37
Interview by PBS Frontline with Michael Short, Lt. Gen.,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html
[hereinafter Short Frontline Interview]. At the same time, there were accusations of
LOAC violations. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO
AIR CAMPAIGN 2 (February 2000), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/natbm002.pdf [hereinafter HRW
NATO Report].
38
Harvey Dalton, Commentary: Harvey Dalton, 78 INTL. LAW STUDIES 199, 202
(2002).
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Unlike the definition of military objectives with respect to
objects, the rules on which kinds of people may be military
objectives contain no explicit advantage requirement. Instead, the
approach focuses on status, membership, and conduct. This approach
to distinction may presume that people who are combatants or direct
participants in hostilities are strategically advantageous objects of
attack; the criteria might be seen as proxies for advantage. But there
is no requirement, for the purposes of distinction, that the individuals
who can be made the object of an attack would be militarily
advantageous targets.
Though sometimes eclipsed by status- or membership-based
approaches, conduct-based approaches may be ascendant in
scholarship and practice.39 Conduct may be a preferable basis for
targeting, especially when status (either combatant or civilian) and
membership provide uncertain or inadequate guidance. Greater
reliance on conduct may either expand or contract the scope of
targeting rules. On the one hand, some conduct-based approaches
may cover individuals who would not fall within the civilian DPH or
combatant categories.40 Targeting unnamed individuals on the basis
of conduct alone has been controversial.41 On the other hand,
conduct-based targeting standards may operate above and beyond
39

See Ohlin, Crisis, supra note 1, at 38 (“Several scholars have suggested that
IHL, in both academic theory and state practice, is moving from primarily statusbased targeting towards an increased reliance on (and demand for) conduct-based
targeting.”) (citing Samuel Issacharoff &Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare:
Individuating Enemy Responsibility, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129860 (last visited May 29,
2013). At the same time, there may be moves toward status. See Ohlin, Crisis,
supra note 1, at 39 (“[T]he development of the ‘continuous combat function’
standard could suggest a return to the primacy of status-based targeting. For some
human rights lawyers this is a disconcerting development. However, the relative
merits of status-based and conduct-based targeting are difficult to evaluate.”).
40
See Heller, supra note 14, at 92-106 (examining conduct-based “signature
strikes” and concluding that a significant number of U.S. signature strikes violate
IHL); See Ohlin, Crisis, supra note 1, at 39 (“According to Heller, while some of
the signatures used by the United States result in attacks that are legally valid
under IHL, others are per se illegal under international law because the signature
may be over-inclusive and pick out targets that are neither directly participating in
hostilities nor exercising a continuous combat function.”)
41
See Heller, supra note 14, at 92-106.
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existing rules, perhaps decreasing the number and scope of persons
open to direct attack.42
Conduct-based approaches may include or encourage
consideration of the threat a person poses. A May 2013 U.S.
government statement on policy standards for the use of lethal force
outside areas of active hostilities suggests that a person who is
targeted must pose a “continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons.”43
This threat requirement, however, operates over and above the “legal
basis” for using lethal force.
Conduct resembles the contribution requirement in the first
prong of Article 52(2). This factor helps determine whether people or
objects are targetable based on the contribution they make to the
efforts of one’s opponent. For people, contribution is a matter of
conduct, and may be captured by terms such as “take part” or
“participation.” Under a conduct- and contribution-based approach,
the contribution that targeting an individual or object will make to
one’s own effort is not directly taken into consideration. The notion
of contribution, but not necessarily conduct, depends at least in
theory on utility for one’s opponent. This is not to say that the
contribution to one’s own effort is irrelevant; it could be presumed or
indirectly served through actions that hamper the enemy’s ability to
advance their own aims.
By contrast, advantage focuses on the anticipated benefits of
one’s actions. This approach determines that people and objects are
targetable on the basis of the attack’s potential to advance one’s
42

See Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (May 23, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/05/23/fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-forcecounterterrorism (last visited June 7, 2013).
43
See id. (“First, there must be a legal basis for using lethal force, whether it is
against a senior operational leader of a terrorist organization or the forces that
organization is using or intends to use to conduct terrorist attacks. Second, the
United States will use lethal force only against a target that poses a continuing,
imminent threat to U.S. persons. It is simply not the case that all terrorists pose a
continuing, imminent threat to U.S. persons; if a terrorist does not pose such a
threat, the United States will not use lethal force.”). See also, Blum, Dispensable
Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 108 (proposing that distinction’s current statusbased approach to combatants should be revised to include a threat-based test.).
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goals. For example, if an armed force faces enemy tanks –
traditionally military objects – protecting a key site, the destruction
of those tanks would probably promise some benefit. On the other
hand, a tank may be passed over if an armed force wishes to leave its
opponent’s military power largely intact.
C.

Beyond Distinction: Advantage and Other Targeting Rules

Do other targeting rules, for example rules on the manner in
which attacks must be carried out rather than those which determine
who can be targeted, impose an advantage requirement with respect
to targeting people? Probably not.44
1.

Proportionality and Advantage

One key candidate for an advantage requirement is
proportionality, which weighs anticipated damage against anticipated
advantage.45 In some circumstances, proportionality may ensure that
attacks on people promise to bring a military advantage. If armed
forces anticipate that an attack will cause damage to civilians or
civilian objects, they must also anticipate that the attack will bring a
sufficient military advantage. If the anticipated civilian damage is
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage, then under
Additional Protocol I Article 57(2)(b) the attack must be cancelled or
suspended. Thus, the military advantage element of proportionality
can function as an advantage requirement in some situations.
However, there are several reasons proportionality may not
impose an advantage requirement in attacks on people in at least
some cases. Proportionality does not guarantee anticipated advantage
44

The rules on the manner in which attacks must be carried out may function
differently in IAC and NIAC. But proportionality, unnecessary suffering, and
military necessity probably exist in similar form in both international and noninternational armed conflict. See, e.g., ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note
6, at 46, 237.
45
See Additional Protocol I, supra note 4, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii), 57(2)(b).
For a discussion of military advantage in proportionality, see, e.g., JUDITH
GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 10002 (2004).
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when there is no anticipated civilian damage.46 Proportionality does
not require military advantage or civilian damage; it only balances
one against the other. Indeed, proportionality focuses on reducing
costs, not ensuring benefits.47 Any advantage requirement that arises
out of proportionality would be indirect in the sense that
proportionality seeks to establish not military advantage but rather a
particular relationship between advantage and damage. While
proportionality may ensure that some targeting decisions are made in
anticipation of a military advantage, it does not constitute or ensure
an advantage requirement for targeting people.48
2.

Unnecessary Suffering and Advantage

Another candidate for an advantage requirement in attacks on
people is the principle of unnecessary suffering.49 Judith Gardam
identifies the principle of unnecessary suffering as the means by
which LOAC “today purports to limit the impact of armed conflict
on combatants.”50 The St. Petersburg Declaration made the goal of
protecting combatants from useless violence an express motivation
46

Michael Schmitt states that “When harm to civilians cannot be avoided during
an attack on a lawful target…proportionality applies.” Schmitt, Fault Lines, supra
note 5, at 322. Gardam discusses the determination of military advantage first and
the calculation of the expected level of civilian casualties second; if that discussion
indicates a required sequence for the application of proportionality, then it suggests
the utility determination would take place in every case. See GARDAM, supra note
45, at 98, 102-05.
47
See ROGERS, supra note 18, at 21-22 for a discussion of extensive damage,
which helps indicate the secondary place of the utility assessment.
48
Proportionality in jus ad bellum may present limits on the harm done to those
open to attack. Gardam suggests that proportionality under jus ad bellum presents a
requirement to limit combatant deaths, writing that because combatants are
legitimate targets, “the level of combatant casualties never became an issue in
[international humanitarian law] and remains a matter for the proportionality
equation in ius ad bellum.” GARDAM, supra note 45, at 14.
49
See Hague Regulations, supra note 8, art. 23(e); Additional Protocol I, supra
note 4, art. 35(2). For analysis, see, e.g., GARDAM, supra note 45; and Henri
Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering: From
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 to Additional Protocol I of 1977, 299
INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98 (1994).
50
GARDAM, supra note 45, at 14.
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of modern LOAC in its early days. Perhaps unnecessary suffering
has not seemed to prohibit – in some circumstances – targeting
combatants because it has been considered useful to incapacitate as
many of them as possible, at all times. Perhaps, if that strategic idea
no longer corresponds to reality, unnecessary suffering will preclude
some attacks.
Nevertheless, unnecessary suffering probably does not
present an advantage requirement. Unnecessary suffering is strongly
associated with the principle of humanity, which focuses on the
elimination or at least minimization of suffering.51 As articulated in
one military manual, “Humanity forbids the infliction of suffering,
injury, or destruction not actually necessary for the accomplishment
of legitimate military purposes.”52 Unnecessary suffering may not
present an advantage requirement because it focuses on suffering
rather than advantage, and in particular focuses on the amount of
suffering caused by attacks rather than the decision to attack in the
first place. But the greater challenge to the proposition that
unnecessary suffering supplies or constitutes an advantage
requirement in attacks on people may be a lack of supportive state
practice. The role of unnecessary suffering in limiting the ability to
attack people, and in particular to engage in lethal attacks, has given
rise to considerable debate and less considerable support.53 These
51

Humanity may serve as a principle which motivates the development,
interpretation, and application of LOAC rules. See Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907 [hereinafter Hague IV], pmbl. ¶
8 (the “Martens Clause”); and Mika Nishimura Hayashi, The Martens Clause and
Military Necessity, in THE LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE: THE JUST WAR
TRADITION AND THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 135 (Howard M.
Hensel ed., 2008). But it is not clear that it functions as a rule of LOAC which
governs the application of force.
52
UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
23 (2004).
53
See e.g., Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants,
24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 819 (2013); Jens David Ohlin, The Duty to Capture, 97 MINN.
L. REV. 1268 (2013); Jann K. Kleffner, Section IX of the ICRC Interpretive
Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: The End of Jus in Bello
Proportionality as We Know It?, 45 ISR. L. REV. 35 (2012); Geoffrey S. Corn,
Laurie R. Blank, Chris Jenks & Eric Talbot Jensen, Belligerent Targeting and the
Invalidity of a Least Harmful Means Rule, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 536 (2013).
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debates often focus on the necessity-related concepts explored
below.
3.

Necessity and Advantage

Necessity is another candidate for an advantage requirement.
In LOAC, the notion of necessity takes the form of “military
necessity,” commonly presented as a fundamental principle.54 This
form of military necessity can be distinguished from the explicit
justification for exceptions to LOAC rules set out in treaties, as in
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.55 While the principle of
military necessity has long been considered a fundamental part of the
law of armed conflict, the details of its nature and form are the
54

For analysis, see, e.g., Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of
War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L
L. 213 (April 1998); William V. O’Brien, The Meaning of “Military Necessity” in
International Law, 1 WORLD POLITY 109 (1957). This work is based on O’Brien’s
doctoral dissertation: William v. O’Brien, Military Necessity; the Development of
the Concept of Military Necessity and its Interpretation in the Modern Law of War
(1953) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Georgetown University); William Gerald
Downey, Jr., The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. (April
1953); Yoram Dinstein, Military Necessity, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), available at www.mpepil.com; and MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR:
TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1994) (Originally
published by Yale University Press in 1961 under the title Law and Minimum
World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion). See also
Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World
Public Order: The General Principles of the Law of War, 67 YALE L. J. 771, 826829 (April 1958). For an early articulation during the American Civil War, see
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,
General Orders No. 100, War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, Washington
D.C., April 24, 1863 [hereinafter the Lieber Code]. For necessity in jus ad bellum,
see GARDAM, supra note 45.
55
Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV reads: “Any destruction by the
Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or
collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to
social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.” Convention (IV) relative to
the relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 53, Aug. 12,
1949.
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source of confusion and little rigorous analysis,56 which casts doubt
on the principle’s ability to serve as an advantage requirement. The
Lieber Code offers the following definition, which has influenced
military doctrine and operations as well as some scholarship and case
law: “Military Necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations,
consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable
for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to
the modern law and usages of war.”57
This definition suggests that military necessity bears a
resemblance, at least, to the concept of utility – and may be the
source of an advantage requirement. In this articulation military
necessity is a mirror image of humanity, and may more directly
address the minimization of useless force, not just useless
suffering.58 Three questions have particular relevance for the
existence of an advantage requirement originating in military
necessity: 1) whether military necessity governs exceptional or
normal actions in armed conflict, 2) whether military necessity
presents restrictions over and above other LOAC rules, and 3)
whether military necessity presents a strict (requiring a lack of
alternatives) or loose (something like advantage) requirement.
Possible answers to these questions flow from military
necessity’s strong association with Article 52(2).59 If military
56

See H. McCoubrey, The Nature of the Modern Doctrine of Military Necessity,
MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 217, 218 (1991).
57
Lieber Code, supra note 54, art. 14. See also Henri Meyrowitz, supra note 49,
at 106 (quoting the Russian Brussels Conference Draft); U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE,
DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS, Joint Publication 1-02 (Apr.
12, 2001, as amended through Aug. 26, 2008); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT01-42-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, p. 130, n. 939 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugslavia Jan. 31, 2005) (Strugar Trial Judgment).
58
See, e.g., UK MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 52, at
23. This definition of the principle of humanity is really military necessity turned
backwards, not its own idea. However, McDougal and Feliciano argue that even if
this is the same idea, it makes sense to have two separate principles to emphasize
competing values. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND
MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
COERCION 522 (1961).
59
See, e.g., Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, ¶ 295; Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case
No. IT-99-36-A, Appeal Chamber Judgment, ¶ 337 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
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necessity is captured by Article 52(2) – which governs normal rather
than exceptional actions, constitutes a specific rule, and presents a
loose advantage requirement – then military necessity may present
an advantage requirement. However, in this form it may not operate
above and beyond existing positive rules, requiring advantage where
LOAC takes a different approach (i.e., in attacks on people). Recent
debates highlight resistance to the notion that military necessity’s
requirements extend beyond existing rules.
The targeted killing and civilians DPH debates have included
prominent interpretations of military necessity. The ICRC
Interpretive Guidance suggests that there is a necessity-based
restraint on the use of force against people:
In addition to the restraints imposed by international
humanitarian law on specific means and methods of
warfare, and without prejudice to further restrictions
that may arise under other applicable branches of
international law, the kind and degree of force which
is permissible against persons not entitled to
protection against direct attack must not exceed what
is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate
military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.60
The author of the ICRC Interpretive Guidance, Nils Melzer,
has elsewhere interpreted military necessity to present an advantagelike requirement for targeting people. Comparing the law on people
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (Brđanin Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Galić,
Case No. IT-98-29-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, n.76 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (Galić Trial Judgment); and Prosecutor v.
Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment ¶ 330 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008) (Strugar Appeal Judgment); Meyrowitz,
supra note 49, at 113; Michael N. Schmitt, Book Review: Law on the Battlefield, 8
U.S. AIR FORCE AC. J. LEG. STUD. 255, 258 (1997-1998); U.S. DEP’T OF THE
NAVY, UNITED STATES NAVY COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M) (July 2007)(sections 5.3.1 on principles and 6.2.6.4.2
on defenses).
60
ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra note 8, at 1040. For analysis, see
discussion below and also Garraway, 25 Years of the Two Additional Protocols,
supra note 31, at 506-10.
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and objects, Melzer argues that “the core criteria for the assessment
of military necessity, namely that military action must be reasonably
expected to lead to a ‘definite military advantage’, can be
generalized and applied also to action against persons [in addition to
objects].”61 Thus, Melzer posits that the law on targeting people
contains an advantage requirement similar to that contained in
Article 52(2), though he claims that he is not advocating the direct
extension of that requirement to people.62
Melzer’s ICRC study recommendation, along with his views
on targeted killing, generated significant opposition, not least
amongst some experts participating in the study. Michael Schmitt,
who participated in the ICRC study, writes in a review of Melzer’s
“Targeted Killing in International Law” book that Melzer’s
characterization of the kill or capture choice is “a classic example of
lex ferenda, not lex lata.”63 Hays Parks, who also participated in the
ICRC study, contests the claim that targeting law requires an Article
52(2)-like assessment for people as well as objects, and otherwise
suggests that Melzer’s work incorrectly imposes law enforcement
and human rights standards in the LOAC realm.64
By contrast, Gabriella Blum suggests revisions to the current
law. First, she recommends that distinction’s current status-based
approach to combatants should be revised to include a threat-based
test or, as she puts it: “an obligation to assess the individual threat
emanating from any particular human target.”65 Second, Blum
suggests that military necessity – which she claims currently allows
61

MELZER, supra note 18, at 292.
Id.
63
Michael N. Schmitt, Book Review: Targeted Killing in International Law, AM.
J. INT’L L. 813, 817 (Oct. 2009). See also Garraway, 25 Years of the Two
Additional Protocols, supra note 31, at 507-10.
64
Parks, supra note 31, at 796-97.
65
Blum, Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 108. For a discussion
of the threat-based approach to the use of force in contrast to LOAC’s status-based
approach, see Garraway, 25 Years of the Two Additional Protocols, supra note 31,
at 502, 506-510. For a discussion of the difficulty of applying a threat-based or
human rights-based approach, see id., at 509. Monica Hakimi’s functional
approach to targeting comes closer to the notion of advantage, but still rests largely
on threat. See Monica Hakimi, A Functional Approach to Targeting and
Detention, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1365 (2012).
62
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for the killing of any combatant, regardless of threat – should be
reinterpreted to require a “least-harmful-means test” that would
require capturing instead of killing where possible.66 Although Blum
is addressing the problem of needless targeting of combatants,
neither of her recommendations would lead to an advantage
requirement for targeting people. The first recommendation – the
threat-based test – aligns with the idea of contribution in Article
52(2) and conduct in rules on civilians DPH. Just because a
combatant presents a threat to enemy forces does not mean that
neutralizing – either capturing or killing – that combatant would
promise an advantage.
Blum’s second recommendation – to reinterpret military
necessity – would dictate the choice between means, not the promise
of utility. Here, Blum seems to presume that all the means to be
chosen between would advance one’s ends.67 But, much like
proportionality, this notion of necessity is orientated toward the
minimization of harm, and advantage may fall by the wayside.
Indeed, if both of Blum’s recommendations had the force of law, an
armed force may be able to lawfully kill a combatant after
determining that the combatant presented a threat and precluding
capture, without engaging in a separate determination that attacking
the combatant would bring an advantage. Advantage suggests that
there can be – indeed, if advantage is a requirement, must be –
purpose even without strict or lesser-evil necessity.
II.

Adding Advantage

Although some scholars have criticized the limitations of the
current law, past proposals for the law’s development do not offer an
advantage requirement. As outlined below, an advantage requirement
has been absent in both lex lata and lex ferenda.
66

Blum, Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 114-15. Gabriella Blum
suggests in another article that LOAC should contain a lesser-evil justification –
which she calls a “humanitarian necessity” justification – for breaking rules:
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil”, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2010). That piece promotes a notion of necessity familiar in some municipal
criminal law contexts.
67
Blum, Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, supra note 33, at 115.
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The Possible Form of an Advantage Requirement

First, what might an advantage requirement look like? The
key elements are the requirements of 1) expected advantage and 2)
placement of expected advantage in the context of a particular time
and strategic circumstances. The precise wording is less important at
this stage than the general idea, but an advantage requirement might
read: In order for a person to be a legitimate military objective, the
wounding or killing of that person must offer a definite military
advantage in the course of an attack or series of attacks, and in the
context of the circumstances ruling at the time.68 If this requirement
supplements rather than replaces current rules, as this Article
recommends, then language could be added to clarify that this
requirement does not replace existing rules.
This provision largely mirrors Article 52(2), with key
differences. First, it does not contain the first part of Article 52(2)
regarding contribution. If utility supplements other rules, then a
person might be targeted on the basis of their status, membership, or
conduct and the fulfillment of the advantage requirement. Second,
the provision clarifies the question of whether an attack might be
considered as a whole, and whether advantage can be considered on
a cumulative basis.69
An advantage requirement might take various forms,
including a legal policy or regulation, or a treaty provision. A treaty
provision seems unlikely, as wide support is required for such a
move and current debates reveal extensive disagreement regarding
rules on targeting people. Another option includes a reinterpretation
68

LOAC recognizes that actions may not yield the advantage parties anticipate,
and parties may be judged on what they anticipate and not on the actual usefulness
or success of their actions. See United States v. List (The Hostages Trial), 8 L. REP.
TRIALS WAR CRIM. 69 (U.S. Military Trib. at Nuremberg 1949).
69
Judith Gardam suggests that military advantage cannot be assessed on a
cumulative basis, with an eye to future rather than short-term benefits. GARDAM,
supra note 45, at 101. But she acknowledges that some states assess military
advantage on the basis of an attack as a whole. Id. at 102. See also DOCUMENTS ON
THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 6, at 511 (on the United Kingdom’s understanding);
ICRC CUSTOMARY LAW STUDY, supra note 6, at 49.
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of current legal principles (for example, military necessity). Perhaps
the most likely form is a legal policy, creating a soft or prudential
requirement. Like Article 52(2), an advantage requirement might
best be seen as an expression of distinction. An advantage
requirement could serve as an additional rather than alternative
approach to distinction, supplementing rather than replacing rules
based on status, membership, and conduct. As an additional
requirement, it would only contract or shift rather than expand the
pool of potential targets.
If utility served as an alternative requirement – as the sole
determinant of lack of immunity from attack – decisions would
depend only on the strategic perspective of the attacker and high
levels of uncertainty and dynamism would result. If the pool of
potential targets shifts based on an estimate of utility, people might
not be able to understand what it takes to fall within the pool and
thus would not know whether they are in it or how to get out. An
advantage requirement that operates over and above current rules
would preclude this uncertainty and dynamism. At the same time, an
additional requirement would not avoid the confusion or difficulty of
existing rules. In the midst of confusion, interpretations which allow
for more targeting rather than less may prevail, leaving people open
to attack in a wider range of situations. An advantage requirement
could provide an extra level of protection.
B.

Reasons For and Against the Addition of an Advantage
Requirement

There are two main reasons to add an advantage requirement
to the rules on targeting people. First, an advantage requirement
would reflect strategic realities. An advantage requirement is
flexible, acknowledging that the significance of attacking people
varies according to circumstances. The St. Petersburg Declaration
links the neutralization of combatants with a particular strategic
vision that does not necessarily represent the circumstances in any
given conflict. Just as the St. Petersburg Declaration is rooted in
strategy, so too is an advantage requirement rooted in strategy –
namely, the notion that it is not a given that wounding or killing
combatants promises a military advantage. Given the diversity of
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conflicts and strategies pursued since St. Petersburg, the utility of
attacking combatants in armed conflict, and the centrality of
wounding the greatest possible number of men, cannot be assumed.70
For example, counterinsurgency operations do not necessarily benefit
from, and often do not focus on, wounding the largest possible
number of opponents. In addition, some recent research casts doubt
on the effectiveness of “decapitation,” the strategy of killing a
terrorist organization’s leadership.71 While strategic contexts vary,
they may not often involve a conventional battlefield where disabling
as many combatants as possible is the major if not sole goal.
Second, an advantage requirement in the law on targeting
people would reflect the core LOAC goal of limiting useless violence
and destruction.72 Current rules on attacking people do not contain a
clear mechanism for that limitation. While the St. Petersburg
Declaration explicitly connects advantage and targeting combatants,
its strategic vision leaves all combatants open to attack at all times,
and there is no clear path by which new strategic perspectives can
present an advantage requirement in the targeting of people. The
protection of both civilians and combatants has been justified by a
mix of reasons – a humanitarian drive to reduce suffering and a
strategic recognition that killing certain kinds of people promises
little or no gain. An advantage requirement might serve both
motivations.
Objections might challenge an advantage requirement as 1)
unnecessary because utility will be taken into consideration through
sources other than LOAC; 2) too costly; 3) ineffective; and 4)
harmful to humanitarian values.
70

See, e.g., THE U.S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD
MANUAL 1-141, 1-149 (2007).
71
See Jenna Jordan, When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership
Decapitation, 18 SEC. STUD. 719 (2009); Jenna Jordan, Killing al-Qaeda?
FOREIGN POLICY (October 6, 2011, 5:54 PM),
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/06/killing_al_qaeda;
and
Jenna
Jordan & Robert Pape, How the U.S. Can Finish Off al-Qaeda, ATLANTIC, MAY 4,
2011.
72
For analysis of core LOAC provisions and principles, see W. Michael
Reisman, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
852 (2006).
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One possible counterargument is that an advantage
requirement is unnecessary because considerations outside LOAC –
for example, strategic considerations set out in military doctrine and
plans – will ensure that advantage will be taken into consideration in
targeting decisions. Should we not expect military forces to constrain
their behavior to what is necessary or at least advantageous?
However, non-legal sources alone may not ensure that targeting
decisions will promise advantage. The use of status or membership
as a proxy for advantage may be relatively easy, though it may be
problematic when there is a gap between the strategic assumptions
underlying existing rules and strategic circumstances. Moreover, an
advantage requirement has the potential to require analysis that is
more costly (e.g., more time-consuming) than the current proxybased targeting analysis, in which advantage may be assumed. And
an advantage requirement might be costly if it led forces to pursue
alternatives to attacks – for example, detention.73
Second, one might argue that an advantage requirement
would be too difficult or costly. However, an advantage requirement
would not necessarily be more costly than existing rules, and
additional costs may be outweighed by benefits. The analysis
required would not necessarily depend on assessment of the threat a
potential human target poses. While a threat-based obligation focuses
on one’s opponent (asking, for example, whether the opponent’s
behavior is sufficient to justify the use of force), an advantage
requirement would draw attention to one’s own strategy as well as
the circumstances of the armed conflict. Therefore, an advantage
requirement would not subject armed forces to the strictures of a law
enforcement or peacetime human rights paradigm in the midst of
armed conflict. An advantage requirement draws less from law
enforcement and more from armed conflict because it depends on
73

Benjamin Wittes has also written about incentives created by a costly
detention policy – namely, the incentive to forego detention and engage in targeted
killing instead. See BENJAMIN WITTES, DETENTION AND DENIAL: THE CASE FOR
CANDOR AFTER GUANTANAMO 23-24 (2011). See also Blum, Dispensable Lives of
Soldiers, supra note 33, at 116-17 (discussing the costs of her recommendations).
If targeting is not possible in situations where detention is possible, then armed
forces may be faced with a more complicated or costly capture and detention
process as the only lawful way to neutralize an enemy.
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advancing one’s military aim. Indeed, the notion of a useful – as
distinct from an unavoidable and proportionate – attack hews to a
core concern in armed conflict and LOAC: eliminating militarily
useless violence.
Furthermore, an advantage requirement would not preclude
the use of proxies and categorization entirely. For example, in a
large-scale conventional battle there may be a high-level decision
that the neutralization of all members of opponents’ armed forces
may be expected to bring advantage in a large geographic area for
the course of a large campaign.
While an advantage requirement may raise certain costs, it
may also remove the costs of useless violence and destruction. And
the law already demands potentially large costs in order to protect
people in certain ways. The U.S. Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
stated that “the rules of International Law must be followed even if it
results in the loss of a battle or even a war.”74 In the face of
decreasing costs of attacking people in some contexts, the effort to
prevent useless attacks might require a more rigorous advantage
analysis.75
A third potential counterargument is that an advantage
requirement will not be effective. This argument may stem from
several concerns, including a concern about the effectiveness of
LOAC in general. However, while an advantage requirement goes to
the heart of military decision-making, various existing rules are just
as invasive – most notably the advantage requirement in the law on
attacking objects. An advantage requirement for attacking people
may function like current rules in many scenarios, and it would
depend on deference to commanders’ judgment as current rules do.
The precise form of an advantage requirement may influence
its effectiveness. Policies and legal clarifications may – for military
and humanitarian reasons – emphasize strategic sensitivity, even if
74

Hostages Trial, 8 L. REP. TRIAL WAR CRIM., at 66-67. But see Schmitt, A
Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 6.
75
See Eric Posner, The Killer Robot War Is Coming, SLATE, May 15, 2013 (2:57
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/05/dro
ne_warfare_and_spying_we_need_new_laws.html.
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this is more than the law demands. Indeed, LOAC is a baseline
standard that may be greatly surpassed in restrictiveness by policy,
for example in the form of rules of engagement. But policies can be
abandoned. Furthermore, advantage would exist amidst – and
sometimes as part of – various other principles and considerations,
and may be lost in the shuffle. Even if there were an advantage
requirement for targeting people, it may not have much effect
because other factors – including categorization and contribution –
may be considered sufficient to justify targeting decisions.
If parties do wish to abide by an advantage requirement,
technological advances may make it more achievable. For example,
the ability of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA or drones) to reconnoiter
for extended periods of time and thus gain extensive information on
potential targets may allow forces to make more agile and frequent
advantage assessments. Ultimately the functioning of an advantage
requirement presents an empirical question to be addressed in
subsequent analyses.
Fourth, one might argue that an advantage requirement would
subvert humanitarian goals because it depends on parties’ military
concerns and goals. But an advantage requirement would not burst
an air-tight bubble of civilian protection. First, the law on targeting
people already includes provisions on civilians DPH which break
through categories and make the more dynamic notion of conduct a
determining factor in some attacks. Furthermore, as a supplemental
rather than alternative requirement, it would create more rather than
fewer restrictions. An advantage requirement might reduce suffering
more, and for a wider range of people – e.g., combatants as well as
civilians.
In summary, an advantage requirement might flexibly reflect
a wide variety of strategic contexts, and serve the core LOAC goal of
reducing useless violence and destruction. The confusion
surrounding existing rules on attacking people may make the
addition of an advantage requirement even more compelling. Further
information may be needed in order to determine the value and
desirability of an advantage requirement.
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Conclusion
Current approaches to distinction allow a person to be
attacked even if the destruction or neutralization of that person does
not promise to bring a military advantage. The law contains an
explicit advantage requirement for objects but not people through
differing approaches to the principle of distinction. Other potentially
applicable rules probably do not present an advantage requirement
for the targeting of people. Proportionality offers an indirect and
occasional advantage requirement. Critiques of purported and
proposed restraints based on unnecessary suffering and military
necessity highlight the uncertainty of those potential sources of
advantage.
While advantage raises questions at the heart of both law and
strategy, convenience and assumptions about the utility of attacking
people may prevent it from playing a more central role in attacks on
people. At the same time, current developments may push in the
direction of a reorientation of the law toward a greater concern for
achieving benefits – a reorientation which an advantage requirement
would promote. As technology lowers the costs of attacking people,
even those outside easily recognized battlefields and military forces,
a greater emphasis on the achievement of benefits may help prevent
useless attacks. And in the midst of confused rules regarding which
people are open to attack, an advantage requirement might provide
an additional, flexible layer of protection and a reflection of the core
LOAC goal of limiting useless violence and destruction.

